Creditors and Debt Governance by Whitehead, Charles K.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers Faculty Scholarship
2-12-2011
Creditors and Debt Governance
Charles K. Whitehead
Cornell Law School, ckw26@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Whitehead, Charles K., "Creditors and Debt Governance" (2011). Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. 86.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/86
Draft of February 12, 2011 
 
 
 
CREDITORS AND DEBT GOVERNANCE 
 
By Charles K. Whitehead 
 
Forthcoming, Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law  
(Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, eds.) 
 
1. Introduction1
 
 
Most corporate debt is private, and most private lenders are banks (although 
increasingly they include non-bank lenders).  (Kahan & Tuckman 1993; Amihud et al. 
1999; Wilmarth 2002).2  Even among public firms, which typically have access to 
larger pools of capital, roughly 80 percent maintain private credit agreements.  (Nini et 
al. 2009).  Consequently, debt’s role in corporate governance (sometimes referred to 
as “debt governance”) has mirrored changes in the private credit market.3  Within the 
traditional framing, bank lenders tend to rely on covenants and monitoring as the most 
cost-effective means to minimize agency costs and manage a borrower’s credit risk.4  
Loans were historically illiquid, and so lenders had a direct and long-term say in how a 
firm was managed.  As liquidity increased, banks began to manage credit risk through 
purchases and sales of loans and other credit exposure, lowering capital costs, but 
potentially weakening their incentives and ability to monitor and enforce covenant 
protections.  The 2007-2008 financial crisis – and recognition that shareholder 
oversight, without the offsetting discipline provided by creditors, could cause financial 
firms to incur socially suboptimal levels of risk5 – re-focused attention on the 
importance of debt governance.6
                                                 
1 Portions of this chapter are derived from Whitehead (2009).   
   
2 Many firms use both public and private sources of debt capital, including bank debt, program debt 
(such as commercial paper), and public bonds.  Investment-grade firms often rely on senior unsecured 
debt and equity, while lower-credit firms rely on a combination of secured bank debt, senior unsecured 
debt, subordinated bonds, convertible securities, and equity.  (Rauh & Sufi 2010). 
3 “Corporate governance,” in this chapter, is defined as a mechanism to reduce or deter agency 
costs arising from management incentives or actions that impede the maximization of firm value. 
4 “Credit risk” is defined as the possibility that a borrower will fail to perform its obligations under 
a loan or other credit instrument, mainly the payment of principal and interest.   
5 Section 971 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act), strengthens shareholder governance by expressly 
authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to introduce rules that increase a share-
holder’s ability to mount  a campaign for minority board representation without a costly proxy fight.  
Diversified shareholders, however, may benefit if a financial firm incurs significant (and socially 
suboptimal) levels of risk.  Some portion of that risk can be managed directly through financial regula-
tion.  (Whitehead 2010).  New proposals also focus on the balancing effect of debt holders.  Creditors 
tend to be more conservative risk-takers than shareholders, and to the extent debt (by its terms) converts 
into equity upon a financial firm’s credit downgrade, those debt holders would have a significant 
incentive to oversee how the firm is managed and minimize risk-taking.  (Coffee 2010).       
6 New credit instruments have been blamed for the 2007-2008 financial crisis, calling into question 
the viability of a corporate governance mechanism that relies, in part, on an increasingly liquid credit 
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There is relatively little “law” in the law and economics of debt governance 
beyond the legal infrastructure necessary to implement debt’s oversight function 
(including contract law, enforcement of contract rights, and bankruptcy law) and a 
greater reliance on debt (with shorter maturities) in countries with higher levels of 
corruption.  (La Porta et al. 1998; Fan et al. 2010).  Governance, in most corporation 
codes, is typically relegated to a firm’s stockholders.  No state, for example, affir-
matively grants debt holders the right to vote, although a few state codes – such as 
California Corporation Code § 204(a)(7) and Delaware General Corporation Law § 
221 – expressly make it optional.  Creditors, nevertheless, can significantly influence 
how a firm is governed – through contractual protections and self-interested actions 
that protect their investment, as well as the disciplining effect that debt can have on a 
firm’s budget and use of free cash flow.   
 
The traditional construct distinguishes between public and private debt, although 
how each is structured turns on many issues (described below) that are common to 
both.  Borrowers in the public market are often larger, more profitable, and have 
higher credit ratings than private firms, and so benefit less from bank monitoring 
(Diamond 1991; Bolton & Freixas 2000).  Lower-credit firms can borrow in both the 
public and private markets, partly because public creditors can free ride on the 
enhanced oversight provided by bank lenders.  (Rauh & Sufi 2010).  Public bonds are 
widely held and easily transferable, increasing agency costs – due to the collective 
action problem of dispersed ownership – but permitting holders to inexpensively 
diversify, manage, and transfer credit risk.  Balanced against greater liquidity, public 
debt typically has less restrictive covenants in light of the public availability of infor-
mation, the higher cost to directly monitor and enforce compliance, and a decline in 
the ability (or, for higher-quality borrowers, the need) to mitigate credit risk through 
contract.  (Smith & Warner 1979; James 1987; Carey et al. 1993; Triantis & Daniels 
1995; Amihud et al. 1999; Rauh & Sufi 2010).  Consequently, a firm that initially 
issues public debt may see a decline in its share price – reflecting a drop in debt 
governance, which can be even more pronounced if, at the same time, the borrower 
reduces bank monitoring (perhaps by paying down its bank debt).  (Denis & Mihov 
2003).       
 
This chapter traces changes in the private credit market.  It begins with a look at 
the traditional role of debt, focusing on the impact of debt on corporate governance 
and, in particular, the effect of an illiquid credit market on creditors’ reliance on cove-
nants and monitoring – a reliance that has continued even as the credit market has 
evolved.  It then turns to changes in the private credit market and their effect on 
lending structure.  Greater liquidity raises its own set of agency costs.  In response, 
                                                                                                                                             
market.  There are, however, important differences between those instruments – primarily tied to sub-
prime mortgages – and unsecured corporate debt.  By their nature, subprime mortgage instruments rely 
principally on collateral to manage credit risk.  Unsecured loans, however, are much more dependent on 
covenants and monitoring without any offsetting protection.  As described later in this chapter, changes 
in the credit market are more likely to result in the introduction of alternative means for lenders to help 
oversee borrowers.  (Whitehead 2009).  
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loans and lending relationships have adjusted to mitigate those costs, providing new 
means by which debt can influence corporate governance.7
 
   
Going forward, a firm’s decision to borrow must increasingly take account of the 
costs and benefits of a liquid credit market.  How firms are governed is closely related 
to how they raise capital.  (Williamson 1988).  Managers who maximize firm value 
can finance their business at lower cost than managers who pursue personal goals.  
Thus, actions that affect a firm’s credit quality are likely to be reflected in changes in 
the secondary price at which its loans and other credit instruments trade.  Those 
changes, in turn, may affect a borrower’s cost of capital, providing managers with a 
real incentive to minimize risky behavior.  The intuition, which I describe at the end of 
this chapter, is that a liquid private credit market may begin to provide a discipline that 
complements the traditional protections of contract.  Changes in the cost of private 
credit may provide a governance function similar to that provided by changes in the 
price of public equity. 
 
2. Debt’s Role in Corporate Governance 
 
In a perfect world, investors would be as familiar as managers with projects that 
require new financing.  Investors often have less information, however, permitting 
managers to invest in less profitable projects that benefit them personally or that favor 
one class of investors over another, without investors being aware of the project’s 
value or the managers’ actions.  (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Smith & Warner 1979; 
Arrow 1981).  Thus, in order to attract new capital at low cost, managers must credibly 
commit to behave in a manner consistent with investor interests. 
 
Debt can help curb management excess, in large part through its reliance on 
contractual provisions, like loan covenants, that require the debtor to make specified 
payments (principal and interest), meet minimum financial criteria, report periodically, 
and operate within bounds specified by creditors.  (Williamson 1988).8  Debt financing 
increases the risk of bankruptcy because payouts are compulsory.  For example, 
although the board can choose to suspend dividend payments, suspending interest 
payments is typically a breach of the firm’s debt obligations and may trigger a 
bankruptcy filing.  Consequently, greater leverage increases a firm’s risk of incurring 
the real costs of financial distress – the actual costs of bankruptcy, as well as a rise in 
risk premiums demanded by customers, suppliers, and employees.  The likelihood that 
a borrower will fail to repay or otherwise meet its debt obligations can, in turn, lower a 
firm’s stock price and increase the risk of takeover.9
                                                 
7 There is a substantial literature on why firms choose to fund with varying amounts of debt, begin-
ning with the Miller-Modigliani claim that, absent frictions, capital structure is irrelevant to firm value.  
Scholarship regarding tax and other real world frictions demonstrate that firm value may be enhanced 
through a capital structure that includes both debt and equity.  I do not address that scholarship in this 
chapter, except to the extent it relates to our principal focus on debt governance. 
  In order to reduce those risks, 
8 A description of standard loan covenants appears in Tung (2009). 
9 By contrast, greater leverage can also be used to deter a hostile takeover, perhaps incurred to 
finance a defensive self-tender offer that increases management’s percentage of voting control, with 
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managers are motivated to maximize profitability, including by reducing business 
expenses, working harder, and investing more carefully.  (Grossman & Hart 1982; 
Jensen 1989; Harris & Raviv 1990; Zwiebel 1996).  Managers also have a direct 
interest in avoiding bankruptcy, since directors and officers of bankrupt firms tend to 
do poorly in the labor market.  (Gilson 1989, 1990).   
 
Debt also affects a borrower’s investment policies.  Start-up firms with high 
growth opportunities, for example, are likely to benefit if management’s hands remain 
untied, permitting them to allocate capital to the most profitable projects.  Such firms 
often have fewer tangible assets, with lenders relying on more costly loan restrictions 
or shorter maturities (both discussed below) to manage risk.  (Billett et al. 2007).  
Slower-growing firms, by contrast, face a greater possibility of managers making 
unprofitable investments, perhaps in areas outside their expertise, driven by an interest 
in building empires for personal benefit.  In those cases, covenants that restrict 
overinvestment or a borrower’s ability to incur more debt may benefit both creditors 
and stockholders. Thus, explicitly limiting a firm’s capital expenditures, particularly 
after its credit quality has declined, is likely to result in an increase in operating 
performance and a rise in stock price.  (Nini et al. 2009).  At the very least, new 
capital investments that extend beyond existing limits – either investment or leverage 
limits, or both – will need to be reviewed and agreed by a firm’s creditors before they 
can go forward.  In addition, by contractually committing to make future payments, 
increased debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow, making less cash available 
to be spent at management discretion.  (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990).  Here, again, a 
significant change in a borrower’s cash flow – perhaps prompted by a change in its 
business operations – may require its creditors’ consent, providing them with the 
ability to oversee and influence certain fundamental business decisions.10
 
   
Debt maturity can also affect corporate governance.  For example, a firm that is 
focused on maximizing stockholder value may underinvest in new projects whose 
benefits would likely accrue to the firm’s creditors.11
                                                                                                                                             
entrenched managers weighing the benefits of continued control against the potential cost and 
disciplining effect of greater indebtedness.  (Harris & Raviv 1988; Stulz 1988; Zwiebel 1996). 
  If funding is short-term, 
however, the projects’ success will be reflected in a lower cost of refinancing, 
resulting in a decline in the firm’s overall cost of capital that benefits stockholders.  
(Myers 1977; Barclay & Smith 1995).  Short-term debt also motivates managers to 
invest in profitable projects or risk the loss of future, near-term financing.  Before 
“rolling over” existing loans, or financing new ones, lenders must be convinced of 
management’s capability and may increase the cost of financing (including adding 
more restrictive terms) to reflect any rise in credit risk.  (Rajan & Winton 1995; Stulz 
2002; Nini et al. 2009).  Long-term debt, by contrast, postpones a borrower’s need for 
10 Note that lenders have an incentive to over-regulate a firm’s risk-taking in an effort to protect 
their own investments, potentially causing managers to forego value-enhancing projects that would 
otherwise benefit stockholders.  (John et al. 2008). 
11 This might occur if the project’s payouts are positive – resulting in an overall increase in firm 
value – but only sufficient to make payments of interest and other amounts owed to the firm’s creditors 
(who are paid first before the shareholders receive anything).  (Myers 1977). 
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refinancing, potentially reflecting concerns over the borrower’s future credit quality.  
(Flannery 1986).  Its repayment, however, is dependent on future earnings and so 
longer maturities may also help to motivate managers to pursue value-additive 
projects.  (Hart & Moore 1995).  
 
 By incurring more debt, managers can commit to making profitable investments 
and operating improvements, also signaling their willingness to pay out cash flows or 
be monitored by lenders, or both.  (Leland & Pyle 1977; Diamond 1991).   The result 
can be a boost in the borrower’s stock price, enhancing the managers’ job security.  
(Zwiebel 1996; Berger et al. 1997).  Higher leverage also gives superior managers the 
ability to signal their quality, separating them from managers who suffer a greater risk 
of bankruptcy.  (Grossman & Hart 1982).  Conversely, entrenched managers may 
prefer less leverage than is optimal in order to reduce the firm’s risk of financial 
distress (and, in turn, the risk of losing private benefits).  They may also limit their 
reliance on debt financing or choose only longer-term debt in order to minimize the 
limitations imposed by creditors and reduce external monitoring.  (Garvey & Hanka 
1999; Datta et al. 2005; Lundstrum 2009).   
 
Notwithstanding the incentive to understate leverage, recent research suggests that 
under some circumstances entrenched managers – those whose interests may be less 
aligned with shareholders – may actually incur greater debt than less-entrenched 
managers.  Managers whose interests are aligned with shareholders (for example, 
whose compensation may be tied to stock price) may make riskier policy choices 
whose returns are more likely to benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors, 
particularly as the firm nears insolvency.  (Coles et al. 2006).12
 
  Lenders may, 
therefore, consider entrenched managers to be less risky – for example, by adopting 
more conservative investment policies (John et al. 2008) – and so be willing to provide 
them with better financing terms, resulting in an overall increase in leverage.  (John & 
Litov 2010).  From that perspective, a greater reliance on debt may reflect weaker 
governance rather than a mechanism to improve management performance.  (Denis & 
Mihov 2003).      
Debt can contractually limit managerial discretion through restrictive covenants, 
with lenders monitoring compliance in order to minimize exposure to the borrower’s 
credit risk.  With the protection of limited liability, shareholders of a leveraged firm 
have incentives to increase the firm’s risk-taking once debt is in place.  Lenders, 
therefore, also rely on covenants to mitigate conflicts with managers who may favor 
                                                 
12 A well-known example is found in footnote 55 of the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (1991).  
There, Chancellor Allen posed a hypothetical where a corporation’s sole asset was a judgment ($51 
million) against a solvent debtor.  The case was on appeal, with the corporation receiving offers to settle 
for an amount that would satisfy both shareholders and debt holders.  Diversified shareholders, 
nevertheless, would be likely to reject the offers and appeal, since the additional upside if the 
corporation won would be theirs, whereas the downside of losing would be borne by both shareholders 
and debt holders. 
- 6 - 
 
the interests of equity over debt.13
 
  (Smith & Warner 1979; Sufi 2007).  To that end, 
covenants act as early warning “trip wires” (Triantis & Daniels 1995) that enable 
lenders to reassess a borrower’s credit risk under weakened financial conditions and 
mitigate loss by renegotiating loans (and reducing leverage) following a breach.  
(Fischel 1989; Hart & Moore 1998; Dichev & Skinner 2002).  Covenant violations can 
be costly, typically resulting in tighter restrictions, lower caps on capital expenditures, 
and an increase in real costs.  For those reasons, managers have a strong incentive to 
ensure the firm complies with their terms.  (Smith & Warner 1979; Roberts & Sufi 
2009a; Nini et al. 2009).  Tighter covenants, in turn, can result in a decline in real 
borrowing costs.  A firm can also improve its borrowing capacity and increase its 
share price through the debt capital available to fund new projects and the positive 
signal provided by new lending.  (Fama 1985; Myers 1989).   
Covenants, however, are imperfect predictors of management behavior, reflecting 
the difficulty of assessing a borrower’s future actions and performance.  (Triantis & 
Daniels 1995).  Covenant violations are not uncommon, but typically do not result in 
lenders accelerating repayment of the loan or taking control of the borrower.  Instead, 
those violations are often waived, but prompt closer scrutiny of credit quality and 
tighter restrictions on the borrower in both renegotiated and future loans.  (Tung 
2009).  Through covenants, creditors can also limit expenditures that might otherwise 
be available to repay a loan in order to ensure a fair return on their investment.  (Chava 
& Roberts 2008).  Although there is a risk that some covenants will limit profitable 
activity, that cost is offset by the ability, among a small group of lenders, to inexpen-
sively renegotiate covenants that have become too restrictive, as well as to exercise 
control rights.  (Myers 1977; Smith & Warner 1979; Bolton & Scharfstein 1996).  
 
A loan agreement may include pre-agreed contingencies that trigger modification 
of a term (or terms) of the loan.14
 
  A pricing grid provides one example.  Under normal 
circumstances, a decline in cash flow may cause the borrower, in light of its riskier 
position, to be better off under the loan’s original terms than if it entered into a new 
loan, creating a strong incentive for it to avoid any renegotiation.  A pricing grid can 
adjust the amount of interest payable by the borrower based on changes in its financial 
ratios or credit rating.  Thus, by increasing interest payments, a pricing grid shifts 
relative bargaining power to the lender, which can then restructure the loan to reflect 
the borrower’s changed circumstances.  Conversely, improved performance can cause 
a drop in interest payments, reflecting the borrower’s better credit quality.  (Roberts & 
Sufi 2009b).  Loan covenants are typically tied to the same measures used in setting 
the pricing grid.  Together, they establish minimum performance standards for the 
borrower, but also reward actions that improve its credit quality.  (Tung 2009).    
In order to minimize agency costs, private debt relies on long-term relationships 
between lenders and borrowers – very often tied to the traditional relationship between 
banks and customers.  (Diamond 1984; Baird & Rasmussen 2006).  Banks often take 
                                                 
13 Examples of the tension between debt and equity, and potential risk-shifting by managers, are set 
out in Amihud et al. (1999).   
14 Examples of loan agreement contingencies appear in Roberts & Sufi (2009b) and Tung (2009). 
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deposits and provide financial advice to their borrowers, which provides them with 
ready access to quasi-public information.  (Black 1975; Fama 1985).  As a result, 
banks can assess credit quality and monitor compliance with covenants at lower cost 
than others, particularly with small- and medium-sized firms.  They are also better able 
to detect and deter managerial slack at an early stage, providing stockholders and other 
investors with a credible signal of the firm’s performance.  (Smith & Warner 1979; 
Triantis & Daniels 1995).15
 
  The resulting benefits can be tangible – a decline in the 
overall cost of capital as other investors, including stockholders, free-ride on the 
enhanced oversight provided by self-interested bank monitors.  Reflecting a bank’s 
superior knowledge, the renewal of an existing loan facility can result in an increase in 
the borrower’s stock price.  Less-informed creditors, by contrast, are more likely to 
seek stricter covenants than banks in order to more closely control a borrower’s future 
actions in light of the higher cost of monitoring.  (Rajan & Winton 1995; Denis & 
Mihov 2003; Shepherd et al. 2008).   
Note that a bank’s superior information can give it greater bargaining power over 
the borrower than a more arm’s-length lender – a potential hold-up problem if the 
bank demands surplus from successful projects as a condition to continued lending.  
Borrowers, as a result, may choose to diversify sources of capital in order to reduce the 
bank’s ability to appropriate rents.  (Rajan 1992).  Likewise, having made a loan, a 
bank may be compelled to extend further credit to a shaky borrower, or otherwise 
forestall a default, rather than risk losing the value of its original investment.  Granting 
the bank a preference over the borrower’s assets may address part of the problem, but 
the bank may still be reluctant to call a default if it results in a drop in the value of its 
original loan.  (Boot 2000).       
 
Reputation can also affect covenant levels.16  A firm that repeatedly accesses the 
credit market has an economic interest in developing a reputation as a “good” bor-
rower.  If it can benefit (for example, through fewer covenants), then it has an incen-
tive – even if not contractually obligated to do so – to act in a manner consistent with 
the lender’s interests.  Lenders may, in turn, begin to relax their reliance on covenants 
and monitoring in loans to borrowers with established reputations.  (Diamond 1991; 
Boot et al. 1993; Sufi 2007).17
 
 
A bank’s informational advantage makes it less costly for it to extend loans than a 
more arm’s-length creditor.  Yet, it also makes it more difficult to resell loans to less 
knowledgeable purchasers, a classic “lemons problem” that originally impeded the 
                                                 
15 Recent research suggests that banks may also facilitate acquisitions through the information they 
receive as lenders and transmit to potential acquirers, possibly in order to reduce their default risk by 
seeking to transfer debt from weak to strong borrowers.  (Ivashina et al. 2009).   
16 Credit ratings historically have provided an important assessment of market reputation, even 
though recent findings regarding conflicts of interest, inadequate staffing, and a failure to follow their 
own guidelines has drawn the credibility of rating agencies into question.  (Partnoy 1999; Hill 2004).   
17 As Jensen & Meckling (1976) famously noted, although reputation can reduce agency costs, even 
“sainthood” will not drive those costs to zero.  Moreover, lenders and borrowers have short memories, 
and so the incentives that make reputation valuable can shift with changes in the marketplace.  (Bratton 
1989). 
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creation of a liquid credit market.  The inability to transfer loans, in turn, reinforced 
the value to lenders of covenants and monitoring.  (Diamond 1984).  To be sure, the 
traditional agency cost model considered diversification as one means to manage risk.  
Portfolio theory suggested there should be a less costly means for banks to manage 
credit risk than covenants and monitoring.18  Doing so effectively, however, required a 
liquid market for the purchase and sale of credit, which did not exist at the time the 
agency cost analysis of corporations was first introduced.19
 
  Thus, the benefits of 
diversification were understood to be principally tied to public equity, with banks 
instead relying on contractual protections to manage credit exposure.       
3. Private Credit Liquidity 
 
The business of banking began to transform in the 1970s and 1980s, driven by 
increasing competition, innovation in the marketplace, and changes in financial regu-
lation.  In particular, new regulatory requirements encouraged banks to change their 
business models, making it more expensive to continue as they had before.20
 
  Banks 
began to reassess lending, with many adopting strategies to minimize their overall 
credit cost.  (Berger et al. 1995; Allen & Gale 1997; Allen & Santomero 2001).   
Debt’s role in corporate governance has remained largely unchanged even as the 
credit market has evolved.  The traditional tools that have helped minimize agency 
costs and curb management excess remain applicable.  Differences in lending struc-
ture, however, have prompted changes in how creditors oversee borrowers.  They have 
also raised their own set of agency costs, which market participants have needed to 
address. 
 
Banks began to diversify their credit risk, requiring a new approach to risk 
management, as well as a liquid market to buy and sell loans and other credit instru-
ments.  New technologies were developed to measure risk and diversification across 
loan portfolios – enabling banks to decide which assets to buy and sell, and at what 
price, in order to optimize a portfolio’s return-to-risk relationship.  (Whitehead 2009).  
The costs traditionally associated with the resale of loans were offset by the real bene-
fits of managing credit risk.  Banks that participated in the loan market could hold less 
capital against riskier loans and more profitable loan portfolios.  (Berger & Udell 
1993; Simons 1993; Cebenoyan & Strahan 2004).  A portion of the gains could be 
passed on to borrowers, for example, through increased lending or lower interest rates, 
potentially resulting in an overall decline in a borrower’s real cost of capital.  (Hughes 
& Mester 1998; Güner 2006; Duffie 2008).  The lending business evolved as banks 
                                                 
18 Markowitz first demonstrated the benefits of portfolio diversification in the early 1950s, for 
which he won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990.  (Markowitz 1952). 
19 I mark the introduction of the agency cost framework as the publication of Jensen & Meckling 
(1976). 
20 For example, the greater regulatory capital charges imposed on banks prompted an increase in 
loan securitizations and syndications, as banks moved assets from their balance sheets in order to reduce 
their effective capital requirements.  (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1999; Wilmarth 2002; 
Whitehead 2006).  
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originated loans for sale to others and bought and sold credit risk in order to better 
manage their overall exposures.  (Llewellyn 1996; Caouette et al. 1998; Bolton & 
Freixas 2000; Calomiris 2000).   
 
Today’s private credit market is increasingly liquid.  Banks have an incentive to 
minimize the agency costs of lending to private borrowers for whom there is limited 
public information.  Spanning that gap – by designing resale arrangements that help 
address the problems of limited information – can reduce the lemons problem, 
increasing a bank’s ability to transfer loans at lower cost, as well as enhancing 
profitability.  (Pennacchi 1988).  Thus, beyond the traditional bank-borrower relation-
ship, a firm’s decision to borrow must increasingly take account of the costs and 
benefits of a liquid credit market, with the resulting changes likewise shaping the role 
that debt plays in corporate governance.  (Whitehead 2009).   
 
Bank lenders can arrange for others to participate in a loan at origination, as well 
as sell all or part of a loan at a later date.  In loan syndications, one or more “lead 
banks” (or “arrangers”) negotiates the terms of the loan and invites other creditors to 
participate at origination.  Interests in a loan, whether or not syndicated, can also be 
sold in the secondary market, which riskier borrowers and non-bank investors tend to 
dominate.21
 
  Through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), a portfolio of loans can 
be sold to a special purpose vehicle that, in turn, issues multiple tranches of CLO 
securities to diversified investors in order to fund the purchase.  Converting loan assets 
to securities, and then transferring an undivided interest through the capital market, 
enhances their liquidity.  (Frankel 1999).   
In addition, credit derivatives enable lenders to transfer credit risk to other 
investors, permitting the separation of a loan’s working capital from its risk capital.  
Using a credit default swap (CDS),22 for example, a lender can buy or sell all or a 
portion of a borrower’s credit risk without transferring the loan itself, enabling the 
lender to more efficiently manage and diversify its credit exposure.  In effect, a CDS 
permits the lender to outsource credit risk to a new group of CDS investors, who can 
assume (and manage) the borrower’s credit risk without funding the working capital 
component of the loan.  (Whitehead 2010).23
                                                 
21 A description of the syndicated loan market, and how it differs from secondary trading, can be 
found in Sufi (2007). 
  The benefits to a creditor of greater 
liquidity could not be replicated at low cost by a creditor’s or borrower’s stockholders, 
providing value-maximizing managers with an incentive to continue to support and 
22 A CDS permits a counterparty to a swap contract to buy or sell all or a portion of the credit risk 
tied to a loan or bond.  The CDS customer pays the “writer” of the swap a periodic fee in exchange for a 
contingent payment in the event of a credit default.  If a credit event occurs, typically involving default 
by the borrower, the CDS writer must pay the counterparty an amount sufficient to make it whole or 
purchase the referenced loan or bond at par.  Although there are important differences, a CDS is, in 
substance, economically similar to a term insurance policy written against the credit downgrade of the 
referenced borrower.  (Masters & Bryson 1999; Glantz 2003; Sjostrom 2009).   
23 A description of different credit derivatives appears in Masters & Bryson (1999) and Glantz 
(2003).  
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grow the private credit market.  (Merton 1992; Merton & Bodie 2005; Gilson & 
Whitehead 2008). 
 
The new credit market has been concentrated among large banks.  (Wilmarth 2002; 
Minton et al. 2009).  Part of the reason may be the informational asymmetry that histo-
rically has given banks a competitive edge over non-bank lenders.  (Acharya & 
Johnson 2007).  Trading among a small group of informed investors, however, can 
still result in the public release of a substantial amount of private information through 
competitive pricing.  Others can rely on that information to make their own investment 
decisions, resulting in an overall increase in market size.  (Holden & Subrahmanyam 
1992).  Greater and more diverse information may also be reflected in price as more 
participants enter the market.  
 
Balanced against liquidity’s benefits is the risk that the “decoupling” of economic 
and control rights – for example, through securitization and credit derivatives – may 
result in less effective governance.  Having transferred the credit risk of a loan to 
someone else, a lender – who, nevertheless, retains full contractual rights – may have 
less incentive to monitor the borrower or act in the interest of those who own interests 
in the loan.  Accordingly, while purchasers of credit risk may be better able to manage 
it through diversification, they may be less able to oversee borrowers as effectively, 
resulting in an increase in agency costs and an overall decline in corporate governance.  
(Partnoy & Skeel 2007).  Transferring credit risk, however, may also enable a creditor 
to more effectively enforce its covenant protections.  The decline in risk exposure 
raises the lender’s relative bargaining power, enabling it to more easily refuse to 
renegotiate a loan unless the terms are attractive.  In the extreme, a creditor who 
transferred its economic risk may have less incentive to renegotiate or restructure a 
loan altogether, potentially reducing the value of the borrower’s outstanding debt or 
even pushing the borrower into bankruptcy.  (Hu & Black 2008; Bolton & Oehmke 
2010).    
 
Likewise, covenant levels may drop if creditors are unable at low cost to monitor a 
borrower’s compliance with its loan obligations or to renegotiate a loan following its 
breach.  As noted earlier, public bonds typically contain less restrictive covenants than 
loans, in part due to the higher cost of monitoring.  Banks, in turn, have an incentive to 
transfer lower quality assets to third parties – with the result that covenants and 
oversight may decline for those borrowers most in need of closer monitoring.  The out-
come reflects a trade-off, with the lower cost of managing credit risk being offset by 
increased agency costs.24
                                                 
24 That description is consistent with the decline in commercial loan covenants that began in 1995.  
For over a decade, federal bank regulators cautioned banks against weakening covenants in syndicated 
loans to risky borrowers. (Wilmarth 2002).  Covenants tightened as the U.S. markets entered a reces-
sionary period in 2001-2002, but by 2006, lending standards had eased considerably to the earlier, lower 
levels.  In particular, before the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, private equity sponsors saw a 
substantial rise in “covenant-lite” (or “cov-lite”) loans – which, as the name suggests, had substantially 
fewer covenants than most commercial loans – jumping from four loans in 2005 to over 100 in 2007.  
Competition among bankers for new business and among investors for new loan assets is likely to have 
contributed.  Reputation may have also played a role.  The private equity market is comprised of a 
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Those costs are similar to costs that arise in the public market, but with a critical 
difference:  Unlike firms that typically issue public bonds, information regarding 
private borrowers is often less well-known.  Some portion of the cost is offset by the 
creditors’ ability to manage credit risk more efficiently.  Yet, as covenants and moni-
toring decline, investors are likely to demand higher returns to compensate for the 
greater risk – a result that is consistent with the drop in governance, but unlikely to be 
sustained if there are less costly means to mitigate the increase in agency costs. (Black 
1975; Ashcraft & Santos 2007).  Market participants, therefore, have looked to change 
how loans are structured and, by extension, have shaped new forms of corporate 
governance.  (Pennacchi 1988).  A key to that change has been the response of the 
private credit market to shifts in the source of capital, as providers have moved from 
bank lenders within the traditional framing to bank and non-bank investors in an 
increasingly liquid credit market.    
 
3.1  Syndication   
 
A loan is more likely to be syndicated as information about the borrower becomes 
more transparent (for example, through a credit rating or listing on a stock exchange).  
(Dennis & Mullineaux 2000).  For less well-known borrowers, the number of lenders 
may be capped and resales restricted in order to encourage direct monitoring and 
renegotiation if a covenant is breached.  (Demsetz 1999; Lee & Mullineaux 2004).  
Participants in the original syndicate are more likely than later purchasers to have 
long-term relationships with the borrower and syndicate manager, enabling them to 
monitor the borrower at lower cost and facilitating coordination.  (Haubrich 1989; Sufi 
2007).  Thus, a lead bank’s traditional governance role may be replaced by the 
collective oversight of a syndicate’s members.   
 
In addition, as a condition of sale, a purchaser can require the lead bank to 
continue to hold a portion of the loan until it matures.25
                                                                                                                                             
limited group of participants that interact frequently, suggesting that a reputation as a “good” borrower 
can have substantial and positive economic consequences.  Market participants also attributed a portion 
of the decline in covenant levels to the increased ability to hedge risk in the credit market and the 
weakening incentives of banks to screen and monitor borrowers.  (Whitehead 2009).   
  By retaining economic risk, 
the bank can credibly commit to continued monitoring and, as necessary, enforcing a 
loan’s covenants.  (Diamond 1984; Pennacchi 1988; Gorton & Pennacchi 1990).  A 
lender can also commit to monitoring if, as is often the case, other relationships with 
the borrower continue to motivate oversight.  Those relationships, however, may be of 
25 That condition is now mandatory for most securitizations, even though not a legal requirement 
for a loan syndication.  Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act added new Section 15G of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which generally requires securitizers to retain at least 5% of the credit risk of 
any asset included in a securitization.  The requirement does not apply to asset-backed securities 
comprised of “qualified residential mortgages” (no credit risk retention required) or that otherwise meet 
underwriting standards established by regulation (less than 5% credit risk retention required).  
Securitizers are prohibited from directly or indirectly hedging or transferring the credit risk they are 
required to retain, unless permitted by regulation.  The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the Chairman of 
the Financial Services Oversight Council to study the macroeconomic effects of the new requirements. 
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questionable value to the extent they potentially result in conflict between the 
economic interests of the loan purchasers and the originating lender.  (Hu & Black 
2008). 
 
3.2  Covenant Levels 
 
Greater liquidity (as in the public debt market) is typically accompanied by a 
decline in covenants and monitoring.  Information about private borrowers, however, 
tends to be less available than for public issuers, reinforcing the need to rely on 
covenants.  Covenants levels, therefore, may also increase in order to offset the greater 
monitoring costs tied to more opaque firms.  Non-syndicated loans structured for 
resale (typically leveraged, risky loans to non-bank, institutional investors) may 
contain higher covenant levels tied to observable public information.  By tightening 
covenants, lenders can more quickly discover changes – including relatively discrete 
changes – in a borrower’s financial position.  In addition, by tying covenants to 
observable data, purchasers can mitigate the increased cost of direct monitoring.  
Investors, as a result, may be better able to manage credit risk and provide greater 
funding.  (Drucker & Puri 2009). 
 
Growing liquidity has also prompted the rise of specialist investors (sometimes 
referred to as “vultures”) that look to influence a firm’s management through its debt 
covenants.  Loans purchased by those investors are often distressed, with the discount 
in purchase price (and potential for substantial return) offsetting the greater cost of 
monitoring.  (Hotchkiss & Mooradian 1997).  Investors use the borrower’s breach of 
its covenants to force change in its policies or a change in control – providing another 
pair of eyes over distressed borrowers, where the potential for management 
opportunism can be the greatest.  (Harner 2008). 
 
3.3  Reputation 
 
Reputation can also help mitigate agency costs.  A reputable borrower is more 
likely to be able to obtain loans with fewer restrictions than a borrower with a less 
well-known credit history.  Consequently, like in the traditional model, a borrower 
may be more inclined to act in a manner consistent with its lenders’ interests to the 
extent it benefits from an improved reputation.   
 
Bank reputation can also be important.  (Dennis & Mullineaux 2000; Drucker & 
Puri 2009).  For investors, how a bank structures a loan or monitors a borrower may 
not be apparent at the time a loan is sold.  The purchaser, instead, must rely on the 
lender’s reputation based on prior sales.  Structuring a bad loan, or failing to monitor a 
borrower, can hurt that reputation – and so, as long as loan sales are a significant part 
of its business, concerns over reputation may induce an originating bank to continue to 
monitor a borrower, even after its credit risk has been transferred.  (Preece & 
Mullineaux 1996; Rajan 1998; Lee & Mullineaux 2004).  Transferring credit risk 
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secretly, while possible, exposes the bank to a potential loss of reputation and a costly 
decline in its ability to sell loans in the future.  (Duffie 2008).26
 
  
4. Debt’s Evolution 
 
So far, we have considered how loan structure has changed in response to greater 
liquidity in the private credit market.  Syndicate structure, covenant levels, and reputa-
tion are all means to reduce the resulting agency costs and balance the potential 
decline in debt governance.   
 
A further possibility is prompted by increasing liquidity in the credit market itself.  
For public debt, secondary trading prices inform the issuer’s managers of how the 
market assesses the borrower’s credit quality.  (Amihud et.al 1999).  Likewise, in a 
more complete market, actions that affect a firm’s credit risk will increasingly be 
reflected in changes in the price at which a firm’s loans and other private credit 
instruments trade.  Those changes may affect a borrower’s cost of capital – including a 
change in the price and non-price terms on which the loans are made – providing a 
discipline, through the feedback furnished by market participants, that complements 
the traditional protections provided by contract.  (Whitehead 2009). 
 
In a frictionless world, a firm’s equity and debt prices should move in tandem 
when new information is discovered.  A loan, in that world, is economically equivalent 
to the lender owning a riskless claim on the borrower and also issuing a put option on 
the borrower to the borrower’s stockholders.  If the value of the borrower’s assets falls 
below the face value of the loan, then the borrower defaults – with the stockholders, in 
effect, exercising their right to “put” the firm to the lender in satisfaction of its claims.  
The implication is that there is a correlation between the value of a firm’s debt 
(including credit derivatives tied to that debt) and equity, so that market prices should 
adjust at the same time and to the same information. (Merton 1974).   
 
In practice, however, credit derivatives often react first to new credit information – 
with their prices moving ahead of changes in both equity and debt (Chan-Lau & Kim 
2004; Norden & Weber 2004; Blanco et al. 2005), as well as in advance of the public 
announcement of a negative change in a firm’s credit rating (Hull et al. 2004).  Thus, 
for a public firm, a change in derivatives pricing may mirror an increase or decrease in 
its credit quality before a change in its debt or equity pricing – providing more 
accurate feedback on the perceived riskiness of the firm’s policies and projects.  
(Glantz 2003).  No doubt, part of the difference in response reflects the special access 
                                                 
26 The Dodd-Frank Act, while enhancing public disclosure around swaps and security-based swaps, 
restricts disclosure of individual trading participants.  Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, among other 
provisions, requires the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the SEC to prescribe rules 
for swap execution facilities and security-based swap execution facilities to make public timely 
information on price, trading volume, and other trading data related to swaps and security-based swaps.  
The CFTC and the SEC are also authorized to adopt rules that enhance price discovery around swap and 
security-based swap transactions.  The CFTC and SEC rules, however, must contain provisions that 
ensure that publicly-disclosed information does not identify the participants involved in the transaction.          
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of market participants, like banks, to private information about borrowers.  (Acharya 
& Johnson 2007).  Part of it also reflects the close relationship between the value of a 
credit derivative and changes in a firm’s default risk.  (Andritzky & Singh 2006). 
 
The growth in private credit may, in turn, affect the terms on which subsequent 
loans are made.  (Norden & Wagner 2008).  Loan agreements already include features, 
like pricing grids (described earlier), that can adjust the real cost of capital based upon 
pre-agreed changes in a borrower’s financial condition or credit rating.  Going 
forward, lenders can rely on the pricing of credit instruments to assess a firm’s credit 
quality and, if necessary, determine the cost of hedging their credit exposure.  A bor-
rower’s actions that change the price at which its existing loans or other credit 
instruments trade can alter the terms of a loan or influence the price and non-price 
terms on which lenders make subsequent loans.  Since most loan pricing over the 
riskless rate is tied to default risk, actions that increase credit risk will result in a 
corresponding increase in a borrower’s cost of capital.  (Longstaff et al. 2005).   
 
One outcome is that secondary trading in private credit may begin to overtake 
covenants and monitoring as an efficient form of governance.  Covenants may be 
over- or under-inclusive, reflecting the difficulty of anticipating future events and 
drafting covenants that properly reflect them.  By contrast, since firms access the 
credit market on a regular basis (Triantis & Daniels 1995), changes in credit pricing 
that directly affect a firm’s cost of capital may provide a more efficient alternative.27
   
  
The impact of more costly debt can be reflected shortly after a change in the firm’s 
credit risk, either through a higher interest rate on an existing loan or the increased 
cost of a new loan.  That cost may, in turn, lower the firm’s share price and, like public 
equity, discipline managers by affecting compensation, retention decisions based on 
share price performance, and the likelihood of a hostile takeover.  To be clear, 
covenants will continue to play an important role in corporate governance, but some 
portion of the traditional reliance may be offset by the feedback provided by an 
increasingly liquid credit market.  The trick, as the markets become more complete, 
will be to balance that new discipline against the traditional role played by covenants 
and monitoring.   
5. Conclusion 
 
Debt governance is an important piece of the corporate governance puzzle.  
Understanding its effects is a principle challenge for the theory of the firm.  Some 
have been concerned, in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, that leverage – 
and, in particular, new credit instruments – can weaken the general economy.  No 
doubt, excessive leverage can be problematic.  Debt, however, can also assist 
productivity through its ability to control agency costs and discipline sub-optimal 
                                                 
27 As Judge Easterbrook has noted, “Additional ways to price or trade financial instruments ought 
to strengthen the capital market as a disciplinary force.  What makes the capital market more efficient 
not only makes governance less important – in what field does it retain a comparative advantage? – but 
also makes governance better.”  (Easterbrook 2002).   
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managers.  Properly managed, it can result in the effective use of available capital, 
enhancing profitability and raising stock prices. 
 
Debt governance may be particularly important for traditional financial 
intermediaries, like banks, that rely on debt (including deposits) for capital.  Unlike 
traditional lenders, consumer creditors – such as depositors – are unable to effectively 
monitor a financial intermediary’s credit quality.  They tend to have limited informa-
tion (and, with government-sponsored insurance, less incentive) to assess whether a 
firm is investing their capital profitably.  To date, an important function of financial 
regulation has been to bridge that gap.  (Whitehead 2010).  Financial firms may also 
benefit through mechanisms that increase the role of debt governance.  A greater focus 
on creditor interests may help balance some of the apparent weaknesses resulting from 
particular focus on equity governance leading up to the financial crisis.  (Coffee 2010). 
 
Traditional debt governance is premised on debt’s relative illiquidity.  Banks with 
access to private information were able to extend loans at lower cost than other 
lenders, but looked to covenants and monitoring as a principal means to manage credit 
risk.  The last three decades have witnessed a transformation in the traditional bank-
borrower relationship, resulting in growth in the private credit market.  Over time, 
with greater liquidity, changes in a firm’s credit quality may increasingly be reflected 
in the pricing of its credit instruments, creating a more efficient “real time” alternative 
that supplements a lender’s traditional reliance on covenants and monitoring.  In short, 
changes in the capital market have affected capital structure and corporate governance, 
and will likely continue to do so.   
 
It may, therefore, be useful to consider the extent to which financial regulation – 
beyond its traditional focus on market integrity, customer protection, and systemic risk 
– may increasingly affect how firms are governed.  Consider, for example, the 
increased regulation of the credit rating agencies.28
                                                 
28 Subtitle C of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act institutes reforms in the regulation, oversight and 
accountability of nationally recognized statistical rating agencies.  It reflects concerns over conflicts of 
interests faced by credit rating agencies and that “inaccurate” ratings played a role in the mis-
management of risk by large financial institutions and investors leading up to the financial crisis.  Its 
purpose is to identify and eliminate conflicts of interest and restore confidence in the ratings process.  
Accordingly, Subtitle C substantially expands credit rating agency accountability and the scope of SEC 
regulation and oversight. 
  A principal focus has been on the 
role of the agencies in informing prospective investors of the quality of the securities 
they purchase.  Yet, just as important is the role they play in corporate governance.  
Changes in a firm’s credit rating affect its real cost of capital, as well as the relative 
mix of debt funding it relies on, providing managers with an incentive to minimize 
risky activities.  (Rauh & Sufi 2010).  To what extent should the impact on corporate 
governance be reflected in the new regulation?  Consider also a bank’s regulatory 
capital requirements.  Changes in minimum capital levels may help minimize systemic 
risk, but they will also affect how private credit instruments are structured and traded. 
(Nicolò & Pelizzon 2008).  Should the effect of those instruments on debt governance 
also inform policymakers’ deliberations over new regulation?  Those questions mirror 
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the evolving nature of debt and debt governance.  They suggest, as well, that debt 
governance must become an increasingly important consideration in regulating the 
private credit market. 
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